Western Balkans in the European Union – real alternative or wishful thinking?

By Michal Hrusik, Winer of Alumni Blog Award

These statements will ring familiar to many Balkan observers. “(Western Balkans) will be part of the EU one day … but it is too early to open the legal process toward enlargement”[1] (French President Emmanuel Macron). “(Year) 2025 is not a realistic date for the EU enlargement”[2] (German chancellor Angela Merkel). And the most famous one, by the former EC President Jean-Claude Juncker: “There will be no new enlargement in the next five years.”[3] Phrases like “enlargement fatigue” have become a well-established part of the public discourse, and more and more people all the way from the windy plains of Vojvodina to snowy mountains in Northern Macedonia are losing their faith they will ever become part of the European family. In fact, according to the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, the majority of Serbs think it will never happen.[4] At the end of the day, one is tempted to observe that the EU pretends it will one day admit the candidates, while the candidates continue pretending they will one day reform themselves. Maybe. Once. In the distant future.

Admittedly, the Balkan aspirants for EU membership could do their homework better. It is enough to look at the annual Commission progress reports, and one immediately sees that in Serbia, “no progress was made on freedom of expression … which is now a matter of serious concern”.[5] In Montenegro, the report noted that “corruption [was] prevalent in many areas and remain[ed] an issue of concern”, while “all institutions should demonstrate a more proactive attitude.”[6] In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina was said to need “to dedicate considerable efforts to sufficiently fulfil criteria by strengthening its institutions in order to guarantee democracy.”[7] Unfortunately, progress is slow, in some cases even non-existent – consider Serbia that regressed from opening two new negotiation chapters per semester to not a single one during the last presidency.

Can we expect a brighter future? I am afraid the prospects are rather dim. But did it have to end up this way? In this opinion piece, I will argue that a much more realistic pathway towards accession should have been offered a long time ago, including maybe a full-scale membership for most, if not for all candidates. Even though this might sound controversial, I believe such a solution would eventually be better for both sides.

There are four key reasons that underpin this reasoning.

GROWING

Firstly, every international organization should strive to grow. This ought to be a natural instinct, and it brings several important benefits along. The larger the organization is, the more influence it has in the international arena – not to mention the direct access to a bigger market. Besides that, this is the only practical way to prevent “third actors” from gaining more power in the not-yet-integrated regions. Countless analysts repeat the mantra about this potential threat, but, unfortunately, we have witnessed few efficient steps enabling the Union to become the real authority. After all, it is far easier for various (semi- or fully) authoritarian regimes to politically or economically infiltrate the countries that are outside the Union, rather than those that have been given the entrance ticket. Hence, I claim that if the region was already a part of the EU, it would become much harder for anyone else to cut up the Balkan cake.

SUPPORTING PRO-EUROPEANS

Secondly, the political situation in most countries of the region was more favorable in the recent past. The Serbian leadership gathered around Boris Tadić appeared to be more authentically pro-European than various current representatives – from both the government and the opposition – who would fit much better in the chaotic 1990s. Similarly, the late Prime Minister Đinđić, an intellectual with a vision – a rare combination these days – was a politician that could have perfectly led any old European democracy. And it is easy to forget that North Macedonia was once considered one of the best prepared countries in the accession process, second only to Croatia.[8] Even people leading the VMRO were not always hardline nationalists; this changed after the unsuccessful NATO summit in Bucharest when their country was once again blocked by its southern neighbor. Having said that, I argue not only that it would have been easier for the EU to deal with the more democratic politicians of the recent past, but also that doing so would have reinforced their position. Of course, the current new wave of populists would still pose a significant danger, but at least their way to power would have been steeper and thornier.

SOLIDARITY

Thirdly, it is helpful to look at the specific cases of Romania and Bulgaria, which are often cited by Eurosceptics as supposedly failed examples of the enlargement process. The critics point out the declining state of the rule of law, omnipresent corruption and general unpreparedness for membership in those two countries. It is precisely this last accession wave that contributed to the much stricter criteria in force today. But was the 2007 enlargement really a mistake? Imagine Bucharest and Sofia still outside the Union, desperately fighting for membership similarly as their less lucky western neighbors. It is very unlikely that the two would have less corruption, more efficient public institutions, a higher level of political culture and clearer foreign policy priorities in those circumstances. Instead, we would most probably witness reinforced nationalism, growing Euroscepticism and a considerable leaning toward Russia.

In fact, EU membership significantly contributed to improving living conditions in both countries – in Bulgaria, in one decade, the GDP increased from EUR 28.7 billion to EUR 45 billion. Currently, Bulgaria receives approximately seven times more money from the EU than Serbia, a country of a similar size and population, gets from the IPA funds. During the same period, Romania benefited from almost EUR 20 billion from the Cohesion Policy and its instruments, more than 35,000 new jobs were created, and over 1,200 small and medium-sized enterprises were supported.[9] Keeping these new members out would mean maintaining poorer and more fragile countries in our close neighborhood. It is very probable that if the Serbs, Montenegrins or Macedonians had been admitted into the Union ten years ago, the region would have gradually become wealthier, more stable and more “Europeanized”. There would certainly also have been costs involved, but ultimately such a scenario brings more good than harm, and it also fosters mutual solidarity, one of the reasons for the EU’s very existence. This solidarity was offered to my Slovak homeland in 2004, Romanians and Bulgarian three years later, and Croats in 2013 – but in the Western Balkans this concept still seems to be missing.

EFFICIENCY

Finally, unresolved bilateral issues are frequently mentioned as crucial reasons blocking accession. The calls for a “normalization of relations” with Kosovo are the archetypical example in this regard. However, there were several cases in the past when the EU allowed countries with similar issues to join, and history has proven it was right to do so. Ireland and the UK entered the Union together in 1973 and it took them 25 more years to find a solution regarding Northern Ireland. As professor Dejan Jović from the University of Zagreb argued, no one expected to solve the conflict before the accession, but the membership itself was utilized later on in order to find a workable compromise.[10] Cyprus is still a divided country; however, it is very doubtful that if the island had been left out, the Greco-Turkish relations would be any better. Similarly, Albanians and Serbs could engage in a dialogue within the EU; obviously, this is a very complex issue and no one can guarantee that a solution would materialize swiftly, but it is hard to imagine that the situation, with all the mutual distrust and hatred, would be worse than it is now.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, what is the reason for the overall deterioration in the countries of the Western Balkans? Why are they suddenly classified as “hybrid regimes” by Freedom House[11] and why does their position in the Corruption Perception Index keep sinking every year?[12] My analysis suggests that a key factor is that they have been waiting too long to enter the EU, while frustrations and Euroscepticism have grown, making increasingly more space for promoting anti-European ideas and authoritarian models. These countries will hardly ever be capable of implementing reforms and fulfilling the criteria if they do not see a real prospect of membership. By contrast, opening the Union’s doors would lead to the completion of the European project, where people of Southeast Europe definitely belong – geographically, culturally, and also politically.

Sources:

[1] Macron on course for clash with Merkel over EU talks with Balkan hopefuls. Reuters, October 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-balkans-idUSKBN1WU156

[2] Encountering hopes and disillusions for the Western Balkans on their arduous path of the European ideal. EULogos, May 23, 2018, https://www.eu-logos.org/2018/05/23/encountering-hopes-and-disillusions-for-the-western-balkans-on-their-arduous-path-of-the-european-ideal/

[3] EU enlargement to the Balkans: The Berlin Process is moving things forward. European Western Balkans, November 23, 2015, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2015/11/23/eu-enlargement-to-the-balkans-the-berlin-process-is-moving-things-forward/

[4] Stavovi građana o spoljnoj politici Srbije. Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, https://bezbednost.org/publikacija/stavovi-gradjana-o-spoljnoj-politici-srbije-2/

[5] Serbia 2019 Report. European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-serbia-report.pdf

[6] Montenegro 2019 Report, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-montenegro-report.pdf

[7] Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the

European Union. European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-bosnia-and-herzegovina-opinion_en.pdf

[8] It was the first non-EU country in the Balkans to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2001. See Ten Years of the Enactment of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Secretariat for European Affairs, http://www.sep.gov.mk/data/file/Monografija/Monograph%20English.pdf

[9] Bulgaria and Romania celebrate 10 years in the EU. Panorama, No. 60, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag60/mag60_en.pdf

[10] Jović: Dugo čekanje na članstvo u EU sprečava uspešne reforme. European Western Balkans, 2019, https://europeanwesternbalkans.rs/ewb-intervju-jovic-dugo-cekanje-na-clanstvo-u-eu-sprecava-uspesne-reforme/

[11] Dropping the Democratic Facade. Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade

[12] Corruption Perception Index. Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi

* * *